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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 





GUY C. PATTERSON, 
Appellant 
v. 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-00193)  
District Court Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 29, 2021 
______________ 
Before: MATEY and JORDAN, Circuit Judges, BOLTON*, Senior District Judge.







 * The Honorable Susan Bolton, Senior United States District Judge for the District 
of Arizona, sitting by designation. 
 
 ** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 




BOLTON, Senior District Judge. 
We consider the claims of Guy C. Patterson, a 55-year-old white male, against the 
Social Security Administration (“Agency”) alleging that, by failing to select him for three 
job openings, the Agency: (1) discriminated against him on the basis of his sex, race, and 
age, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the federal-sector 
provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”); and (2) took 
retaliatory action against him in violation of Title VII and the ADEA.  Patterson filed his 
lawsuit in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  The District Court 
granted the Agency’s motion for summary judgment and denied Patterson’s cross-motion 
for summary judgment on all claims.  It also denied Patterson’s subsequent motion to 
alter or amend this judgment.  Patterson timely appealed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 29 U.S.C. § 1291. 
I. DISCUSSION 
Patterson’s claims fail as a matter of law.  “We exercise plenary review over a 
district court’s [order entered on motions for] summary judgment, and we apply the same 
standard as the district court.”  Bletz v. Corrie, 974 F.3d 306, 308 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation 
omitted).  “Summary judgment is appropriate where, construing all evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Applying those standards, we conclude that the record 
supports the District Court’s judgment that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law 
to prove any of Patterson’s claims.  Patterson argues that a recent Supreme Court case, 
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Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1177 (2020), changes this result, but fails to offer 
evidence that meets even Babb’s lower causation standard.  Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1177-78 
(but-for causation not required to establish liability for violation of ADEA’s federal-
sector provision).1   
Patterson cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title 
VII or the ADEA because he has insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent.  See 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (burden-shifting 
framework requires plaintiff to establish prima facie case); Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination “requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) 
he/she was qualified for the position; (3) he/she was subject to an adverse employment 
action despite being qualified; and (4) under circumstances that raise an inference of 
discriminatory action, the employer continued to seek out individuals with qualifications 
similar to the plaintiff's to fill the position”).  Even if he could make such a showing, the 
Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting Patterson 
for each position, including lower interview scores.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 
U.S. at 802 (burden-shifting framework requires employer to articulate legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action).  Patterson’s evidence is 
 
 1 Patterson also raises the following issues: The District Court erred in failing to 
consider the applicability of Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) to his claims, and 
the Agency failed to comply with an Office of Personnel Management regulation, which 
Patterson argues is material to his employment discrimination claims.  We find none of 
these arguments have merit. 
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insufficient to show that any of these reasons were pretextual.  See id. at 804 (burden-
shifting framework permits plaintiff opportunity to show pretext).  
Patterson also fails to produce evidence sufficient to establish a causal connection 
between his non-selection and retaliatory animus.  See Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 
F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2006) (“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation . . . a 
plaintiff must tender evidence that: (1) [he] engaged in protected activity . . . ; (2) “the 
employer took an adverse employment action against [him]; and (3) there was a causal 
connection between [his] participation in the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
The District Court correctly granted summary judgment on all claims.  
II. CONCLUSION 
Because Patterson’s evidence cannot prove his claims, we will affirm.  
